

# **The Role of Transboundary Environmental NGOs in Building Sustainable Markets**

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## Abstract

Globalization is changing traditional ideas and conceptions of policy making and the role of governments and governance (Sonnenfeld and Mol, 2002; Spaargaren, et al. 2000). Global markets have become a significant force in politics, economics, and the social sphere everywhere on earth. National and transnational environmental problems, which are partially caused by unsustainable international trade, are the unfavorable consequences of globalization. Thus, it is important to understand how NGOs work transnationally to prevent these negative consequences and promote positive outcomes.

This paper examines the potential of transboundary environmental NGOs, specifically World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Greenpeace, and Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which operate on sub- and super-state levels to green global corporations, build sustainable markets, and develop new para-regulatory forms of governance within Russia.

## Introduction

After Perestroika and the opening of the borders of the former Soviet Union, Russia experienced a rapid in-flood of Western culture. After a little over a decade, an array of multinational companies have built infrastructure to facilitate their entrances into Russia's economy. The first McDonalds came to Russia as early as 1990. Coca-Cola now has a massive warehouse just outside St. Petersburg, Ikea has one near Moscow, and American and European clothing corporations operate stores throughout both cities. The environmental movement of the West, specifically large transnational environmental organizations, entered Russia and established active subsidiaries as quickly as commercial interests did. These organizations, bringing with them Western money, Western values, and Western ideas of nature protection, officially entered Russia's political and economic spheres. Greenpeace came in 1992 and created a central office in Moscow, followed by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in 1994. Since then, these and other large environmental NGOs have tried to influence government policy, industry, and the environmental awareness of Russian citizens. In so doing, these groups have contributed to the in-flood of Western Culture. The expansion of Western environmentalism into Russia since the early 1990's has brought with it ideas and concepts of nature conservation and techniques of natural resource exploitation developed by the science, industry, and the third sector of the U.S., Canada, and European countries.

Forests are one of the most important natural resources in Russia, both from the viewpoint of potential economic development as well as from that of environmental well being. According to figures published by WWF, Russia contains nearly 21% of the world's entire timber reserve, and nearly 25% of the remaining untouched, virgin forests on the planet (WWF 2000). Greenpeace and WWF assign a planetary value to these forests, and so they have raised great amounts of money and effort into their protection. In this process, they have come to play an important role in Russian forestry politics. As we will see in our cases, they have also been instrumental in promoting forest certification under the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). FSC publishes various criteria and standards of sustainable forestry that are accepted nearly everywhere in the world. These standards provide that forestry is environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial, and economically viable. Companies that become FSC certified have an advantage in selling to sensitive markets, such as those in Western Europe. In this way, the culture of Western forestry becomes of economic value to timber companies working in the European part of Russia. Greenpeace and WWF are working to introduce a European environmental ethic into the country's forestry business. This cultural imperialism of sorts will ultimately allow Russia to enter global markets while maintaining a sound foundation of natural resource exploitation.

We will look at how two large transnational environmental organizations, Greenpeace and WWF, bring the environmentalism of the West to Russia. In the last ten years, these two organizations have become especially influential in the "non-state driven market" (Cashore, 2002) of Russia's forest sector. However, in Russia, non-governmental sectors cannot operate apart from the government because all land, including forests, is federal property. Government agencies manage forests, from the Ministry of Natural Resources on the federal level to the *leskhoz* on the local level. Furthermore, the *lesoustroistvo*, an agency of regional government, creates plans and limits for harvesting by region. Thus, all third sector nature protection initiatives necessarily include the Russian government as a landowner. In our cases, we will see how the Russian context alters the strategies and schemes of transboundary organizations. Greenpeace and WWF employees working in Russia are nearly all Russian, however, the money for preservation and the culture of "what needs to be preserved and how" is filtered down from international headquarters into the newly formed Russian branches. We will also see how these Russian branches differ in specific ways from their international headquarters, and how Russian employees modify Greenpeace and WWF strategies through a prism of implementation in order to better fit Russia's unique transition economy.

We will also see how these organizations encounter Russian government, industry, and public. This paper will illustrate the barriers they face in importing Western environmentalism to different stakeholders in the forest and different sectors of Russian society. We will highlight the strategies and opportunities that allow them to link and network and get their projects done. Thereby, specific characteristics of Russia political, economic, and social culture will come into light.

Many sociologists have described those aspects of the globalization process that relate to environmental protection (Yearley, 1994; Sklair, 1994). Many reports have focused on the negative aspects of globalization for local communities and natural resources. Our case shows that globalization processes can, in fact, be quite beneficial for the growth of environmental movements. There is a niche in environmental sociology

concerning these positive outcomes (Spaargaren, Mol, Buttel, 2000). Our paper will pertain to this niche by showing the beneficial consequences of international NGOs protecting Russia's forests. Other researchers, although few, have dealt with the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the expansion of its legitimacy (Cashore, 2002; McNichol, 1999). These studies have only covered FSC processes in Western countries. This paper represents the first to examine NGO-driven processes of FSC's expansion into the former Soviet Union.

In our theoretical approach, we will look at the borders between Russia and Western Europe not only as passive geographical entities but also collectively as an institution. This border is indeed a peculiar institution, one that has experienced fundamental changes during the last 15 years, and one that has warranted extensive research and analysis. What used to be an "iron curtain" dichotomizing the world has now become very porous. Now, through the processes of European Enlargement, Russia is experiencing the operations of transboundary environmental organizations. Their efforts to green European establishments and citizens are filtering through the border. European institutions such as European Parliament and the European Commission are developing environmental policy for whole regions, and closely partnering with WWF's Brussels office. Mainly through third sector efforts, the environmental consciousness and concern of European citizens and companies are not caged within the nation-state, nor within the political boundaries of Western Europe. Rather, they have become global. As we will see in our paper, the environmental sensitivity encouraged by NGOs in Europe influences Russian institutions and the ways in which Russian citizens interact with their natural landscape. There is cross-border penetration, however, only so deep into Russia's central part. We will take on this approach and analyze transboundary environmental organizations in order to see how European processes influence the affairs of Russia.

We will also use the concept of non-state market driven governance (Cashore, 2002) to see how NGOs green the supply side of Europe's transnational wood flows. We will study how FSC and sustainable forestry as a practical concept are gaining legitimacy in Russia.

#### *Methodology - case study selection*

By analyzing a total of four initiatives to protect Russia's forests, we have isolated specific instances in which these two organizations bring Western culture to Russia. We applied a qualitative case-study comparative approach (Yin 1994). This included fieldwork in which we visited each of the four localities and conducted a total of 75 in-depth interviews with all stakeholders - NGO representatives, government, industry, public, and science.

Our two Greenpeace cases take place, respectively, in Karelia Republic and Murmansk Oblast<sup>1</sup> along Russia's border with Finland (i.e. Western Europe). Greenpeace, along with other NGOs, conducted an international consumer campaign in Europe highlighting the logging of valuable old-growth forests in these regions. By encouraging European buyers to boycott products from Russian old-growth, Greenpeace effectively eliminated the threat of logging. NGOs then tried to include these forests in new specially protected natural areas - one in Karelia and one in Murmansk. These cases are similar in regard to the distance to European markets, however, the character of both

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<sup>1</sup> Both "republic" and "oblast" entail the same level of government as subjects of the Russian Federation.

government and industry in Karelia and Murmansk differ. Murmansk's regional government is more progressive and more willing to work with environmental NGOs. At the same time, forestry is less important in Murmansk's economy because it is further north and lies mainly in a forest-tundra transition zone. These two cases illustrate the same third sector network striving for the same effect, however, its different levels of achievement depend heavily on regional differences.

With WWF, we chose to study two demonstration projects - Pskov Model Forest and Preluzye Model Forest. Here, WWF is trying to import FSC and create working models of FSC-certified sustainable forestry. Based on FSC's economic, ecological, and social standards, WWF is trying to create demonstrations that other forest producers can reproduce throughout Russia. The model forests in Pskov and Preluzye share WWF's basic goals, strategies, and innovations. However, the primary disparity for our analysis concerns the distance to European timber markets. Pskov is a city close to Russia's border with Estonia, and thus close to Western Europe. Hence, its forestry is export-oriented and dependent on European buyers. Conversely, Preluzye is in the Komi Republic, just west of the northern Ural Mountains. This is far from Europe and so companies there mainly provide wood for domestic timber markets. Furthermore, one large multinational company STF-Strugi works in Pskov Model Forest, as opposed to the several small, Russian companies working in Preluzye Model Forest. By analyzing WWF's partnerships with industry, government, and the public in both localities, we will see the disparate levels and different kinds of achievement in these two cases.

#### Greenpeace – Russia's New Forest Police

Greenpeace-Russia's forest campaign focuses primarily on the protection of old-growth forests in Northwest Russia. This program is in conjunction with the Forest Club, which includes the Center for Biodiversity Conservation (CBC) and the Socio-Ecological Union (SEU). It also includes the Nature Protection Corps, which began as an environmental structure in Soviet times and involved students in clean-ups and research. Using satellite images, the Forest Club inventoried and mapped virgin forests throughout the Northwest. They take this data to the public of Europe, to the Russian government, and to companies involved in using the forest resources of this area. The Forest Club's message is manifold: they list companies logging these old-growth forests, as well as those buyers in Europe that accept wood from these companies. They implore the European public to boycott products made with Russia's old-growth wood. They warn timber companies and European buyers to establish moratoriums on logging these forests. With the Russian government, they try to initiate a process of creating a specially protected natural area in order to preserve the old-growth. This last effort also witnesses the introduction of nature protection measures created in the West, including National Parks and UNESCO World Heritage Areas created by the UN.

The market protest gets its muscle from the extremely necessary and sought after economic links between Russia and the rest of Europe. For this reason, the Forest Club focuses on areas in Western Russia that rely on exporting timber to Western Europe. Companies logging old-growth in Karelia are breaking no laws or norms of the Russian Federation, however, NGOs are trying to enforce new global environmental laws that are beyond the control of any one state.

The Forest Club, led by Greenpeace, is trying to establish the concept of a “virgin forest” both in the legislation of the Russian Federation and in the awareness of industry and the public. The goal is to convince stakeholders in the forest that virgin forests have a value and must be preserved. Russia’s legislation does recognize levels of value in a forest, including those of the “first level” which roughly corresponds to un-logged, old-growth. However, what Greenpeace is bringing from the West is an economic value and an urgency to preserve these forests. The concept of old-growth and its modern value grew in Western Europe where there are virtually no unlogged forests. The attempt to import this idea into Russian industry and government is not fluid, because Russia, unlike Western Europe, contains vast stands of virgin forest.

One example of Greenpeace’s campaign took place in the Republic of Karelia, which contains Russia’s longest border with Western Europe (Finland). Karelia offers Russian forestry a unique combination, in that it contains huge tracts of virgin forest with proximity to important timber markets of the West (Autio, 2002). This, while most of the country’s forest resources are far to the east and less accessible in Siberia. As several researchers have recounted, in the early 1990’s, Greenpeace, the Forest Club, and the Taiga Rescue Network started an international consumer-information campaign that attempted to vilify companies logging Karelia’s old-growth, as well as those companies in Europe buying from them (Vorobiov, 1999; Yanitsky, 2000). The campaign included numerous publications, videos, conferences, and protests. The NGOs investigated the timber sources for publishing houses in England, Holland, and Germany, and requested that they boycott the logging of Karelia’s old-growth. This culminated in 1996 with a series of publicized protests both in the forests of Karelia and at the pulp-and-paper mill of the large Finnish logging company Enso (Yanitsky, 2000) This led to Enso’s announcement of a one-year moratorium on logging in three important plots of the disputed forests in Karelia. In 1997, several companies, both Finnish and Russian, joined the moratorium.

*Overcoming Government Resistance:*

*Kalevala National Park - Karelia Republic*

All funding for this campaign came from Western Europe. Many Greenpeace branches in Europe redirected some of their funds specifically for this work in Karelia conducted by Greenpeace-Russia. Money for the establishment of specially protected natural areas along Karelia’s border with Finland came from the Tacis Program, through which the European Union provides grants for the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Tacis gave the Karelian government 3.5 million dollars to establish two new national parks, one of them Kalevala National Park, and build tourist and nature protection infrastructure for two already in existence. For the Russian government, the overwhelming interest of European NGOs and European governments in Karelia’s forests is not readily explicable. In our interview with government officials, we heard various theories - NGOs are saboteurs trying to undermine Russian forestry for the benefit of Scandinavian competitors, or NGOs are exaggerating the urgency of protecting Russia’s virgin forests and biodiversity, both of which currently abound. Whatever the theory, a prevalent accusation given by all government officials was that Europe logged nearly all of its own old-growth forest and so is creating a double-standard by forcing Russia to preserve those which remain. An independent scientist agreed with this last sentiment,

saying, “[Kalevala park] will have significance for all of Europe . . . They cut everything on their territories and we will preserve on our territory. In their own country they use forests like orchards in rows, and on our territory they will use it for recreation so that they can see wild nature and have fun” (Interview, 2002). Furthermore, government officials as well as independent scientists lament that even if the Tacis grant helps to establish new national parks, the Russian government does not have enough money to maintain them. One respondent from science said, “We have two acting parks and if it were not for international projects like Tacis, the parks would sit on the budget and nothing would be done with them. The director of a park normally gets 200 rubles a month, but from Tacis he got 80 times his annual salary. Such support is impossible to get absolutely permanent” (Interview with scientist from Karelia Science Center, 2002).

This campaign was the first to demonstrate such a relationship between Western Europe and Russia. It helped shed light on the difficulties and complications of importing Western environmentalism. By demonstrating Greenpeace’s influence, this case set a precedent for all future environmental initiatives throughout Russia. It showed environmental organizations what must be done to accomplish certain nature preservation tasks. For instance, in designating Kalevala National Park and writing its justification, Greenpeace operated through a local student environmental NGO SPOK and local scientists from the Karelia Science Center. NGOs in Russia frequently must do technical work in place of the government. A SPOK worker said,

“In the West . . . you spread knowledge about the problem and immediately the public begins to participate. The authorities get kicked and then they understand the problem well and begin to do something . . . From Russian power structures there is no action . . . To achieve something here you need first to make a big noise, and then secondly you need just to do everything yourself, in place of the government. And then you will achieve results” (Interview with head of SPOK, 2002).

Greenpeace is known throughout the world to take a radical and confrontational standpoint, and the Russian government received a rude introduction to Western NGOs. While scientists completed documents for Kalevala National Park, the governor of Karelia refuses to sign it into existence. This standoff recently entered its third year. Government officials that we interviewed argued a strict “forestry is economy” line, emphasizing the need to produce given the region’s poor economy since Perestroika. The forest sector is indeed Karelia’s strongest source of wealth, and it has been so since tsarist times. But another source of the government’s annoyance with Greenpeace’s effort to stop the logging of old-growth was the fact that a non-governmental, and even foreign, interest was trying to dictate what and how the Russian government should conduct their business. One respondent said,

“I want this project conducted on the territory of the Russian Federation and by the government of the Russian Federation . . . and Karelia Republic. Here, however, this project is not well coordinated. It is chaotic. Greenpeace came here and handcuffed themselves. Moscow is far from here, but pretty girls and boys came from there in white pants and skirts and made noise, noise, noise . . . I would like our state to take into its hands all positions and solutions to this issue. Those who come here with their own initiatives should know their place . . . They have the right to voice what they want,

but initiatives and decision-making should come from the power structures and the state.” (Interview with head of Karelia Ministry of Natural Resources, 2002).

Here we see lingering effects of Soviet culture, in which government contained all sectors of social, political, and economic life. This respondent seemed dismayed that any initiative should come from a non-governmental source. Throughout this project, there remained a blatant gap in communication between NGOs and Karelia’s government. Those government officials that are directly involved in the creation of specially protected areas, specifically Karelia’s governor Katinandov and the head of the Ministry of Natural Resources, refused to meet with environmental NGOs. One of our respondents from the NGO SPOK said,

“They [Greenpeace] tried very much to arrange meetings. And when the meeting was set up, they [the Karelian government] put there only *assistant* governors who were available at that moment. This came to no agreement. They came to the meetings and were saying ‘yes yes’ and shaking their heads. Or they would show up and say that they cannot have the interaction today. Sometimes they were just silent and said nothing. Sometimes they said simply ‘we don’t support the issue’. But with Katinandov himself, whose status allows him to say either yes or no [to the proposed park], a meeting was never arranged. This is just not understandable” (Interview with SPOK, 2002).

About the head of the Ministry of Natural Resources, one of our Greenpeace informants said,

“It is absolutely impossible to reach him or arrange a meeting. He does not talk with representatives of NGOs. It is his principle. He doesn’t even say hello. . .It is impossible to have a normal conversation with them”. (Interview with coordinator of GP Forest Campaign, 2002)

Greenpeace and local activists wrote letters, however, these attempts also met with a stiff self-aggrandizement of the Russian government. A specific rule in Karelia requires that the government respond to any letter or request within one month after it is received. According to our NGO informants, government officials frequently waited the entire month, and then sent responses such as “we wrote to Katinandov and he will analyze the situation and answer to the government and to you about what exactly is going on’ . . . But nobody does anything. Everybody just has correspondents and nothing is done” (Interview with head of SPOK, 2002). Based on this poor interaction, one of our Greenpeace respondents has called the Karelia Republic a “museum of socialism” (Interview with coordinator of Greenpeace Forest Campaign).

We can see that Greenpeace is not only bringing the value of “old-growth” to Karelia, but also, to the government’s dismay, the strength of the third-sector, as it has developed in the Western world. Greenpeace and its fellow NGOs were able to bring a logging moratorium on these forests without the consent of the Russian government. Companies that already had old-growth forests under rent had to break their contract agreements to log within a specified time. Furthermore, the leskhozoes that contained these forests signed illegal agreements with NGOs stating that in the future they would not rent these forests to any company. Our government respondents were especially

angered at this. With the help of economic interests, Greenpeace and the Forest Club practically overpowered the government of Russia on this issue. Thus we can see, interestingly enough, that due to the political and economic changes of the 1990's, the future well-being of Russia's old-growth forests largely depends on the strength of the West's third-sector.

This case saw virtually no interaction between NGOs and industry, beyond the consumer campaign of the 1990's. During this time, all international companies working in the disputed old-growth forests of Karelia abandoned their rent. No company, Russian or foreign, would apply to log these forests, and so NGOs had no further business with industrial stakeholders.

*Partnering with Business:*

*Lapland Forest - Murmansk Oblast*

Another case of the Forest Club's work, this one in Murmansk Oblast, illustrates the importance of Russia's commercial interests in Europe as a primary vehicle for importing environmental standards to Russia. This region is just north of Karelia, also bordering Finland, and its forest industry was also affected by the Forest Club's campaign. This case shows a remarkably different relationship between NGOs and the region's government. Greenpeace and the Forest Club, represented in Murmansk by the Kolski branch of the CBC, were able to influence the government much more so than in Karelia for two reasons. First, forestry is not Murmansk's main industry, as its landscape is dominated by less-valuable forest-tundra. Thus, unlike in Karelia where forests are extremely valuable, the government is more willing to make concessions to protect forests over which Europe is producing hubbub. The second and more important reason that NGOs were able to reach agreements with the government was the help of one influential businessman in the region.

The company ZAO 'Priroda' is the largest forest producer in Murmansk oblast and rents part of Lapland Forest, which contains virgin boreal forests. The head of this company is well respected by government and by environmental activists alike. The success of the company can be partially attributed to their use of modern Finnish technology and their access to Western timber markets. These international markets also became the main tool for environmental NGOs to influence the operations of ZAO 'Priroda'. After the protest campaign in Karelia, and much discussion and debate, the company signed an informal agreement to halt logging old-growth forests. The head of ZAO "Priroda" said,

"We take into account our image with western consumers, otherwise they won't buy our product. I am against leaving such a huge territory for a nature preserve. But I have to comply. My partnership with the greens is not a real partnership - it is pressure. The partnership between entrepreneurs and greens is like the partnership between a big fish and a little fish, or like traffic police and drivers. This is compliance with the law and not a partnership . . . If we are not partners, then I will be out of work" (Interview, 2002).

His rhetoric of "police" and "law" illustrates the strength of the consumer market campaign and those NGOs that conducted it. The environmental concerns and economic concerns of the West have come to Russia hand-in-hand, and both industry and government are put under intense pressure to comply. The environmentally sensitive

markets of Europe have become the number one most powerful bargaining chip for Western environmentalism in the former Soviet Union. If Russia is actually changing and “greening”, the sensitivity of European markets is truly the reason.

In Murmansk Oblast, the Forest Club used European markets to link with the Russian company ZAO ‘Priroda’, and then used its links with this company to influence the Russian government. First, the leskhoz agreed not to rent the disputed forests to logging companies. One respondent from CBC said, “The leskhoz gave the territories for protection because they are primarily interested in a good relationship with him [the head of ZAO ‘Priroda’]. When he tells the leskhoz what to do, they listen” (Interview with Kolski CBC staff, 2002). NGOs reached an agreement with the regional administration with the same ease. According to the head of ZAO ‘Priroda’,

“I come in and say ‘sign a paper for the green guys’ and [administration] will sign it in a moment and not even think about it. For example, in the Kolski region we decided not to cut. The greens decided they wanted to protect the forests. If I did not say to administration that I agree, administration would never sign anything with the greens . . . If I did not help the greens then [CBC] would have to spend plenty of time trying. But with me, they got a signature in 15 minutes” (Interview, 2002).

This statement does well to illustrate the way in which environmental organizations can effectively move the Russian government as they want, given a good relationship with business.

#### WWF brings FSC to Russia

FSC is WWF’s primary tool for promoting sustainable forestry in Russia. In 1993, FSC was created to establish a standard of forestry that is sustainable and beneficial to all stakeholders in the forests. Among its many criteria are efficient harvesting technologies, forest practices designed to preserve biodiversity, and public participation in decision-making for forest management. With more than 130 members from 30 countries, FSC is currently the most widespread certification standard with 18 million hectares of the world’s forests FSC certified (Tatarinov, 2000). 1000 forest producers in Europe have acquired FSC certificates for the entire chain of production from logging, processing, and delivering a forest product to the consumers. WWF’s promotion of FSC is a way of bringing Russian industry into European markets, and bringing the EU’s environmental code into Russia. These two goals are actually two sides of the same coin. In order to make certification more accessible in different regions throughout the country, WWF helps write FSC criteria specific to each region. This makes certification more appropriate and comfortable for companies working in specific forests, within specific social contexts, and with specific economic possibilities. Interestingly, governments of Western Europe fund much of WWF’s promotion of FSC in Russia, including the World Bank, the Swedish International Development Agency, and the Swiss Agency for Development and Collaboration.

WWF’s promotion of FSC in Russia consists of publications, information dissemination, and conferences with industry and government. The loudest promotion of FSC consists of “Model Forests” in which WWF creates a demonstration of sustainable forestry. Here, we will analyze two model forests, one in Pskov near the border with Estonia and one further east in Komi Republic near the Ural Mountains. We will see how

the distance to Western Europe influences the economic potential of forest producers in the respective regions, and, therefore, also influences industry's receptivity to FSC. While differences in government attitudes and public cooperation also play a part in the success of a model forest, we will see that the willingness of industry, which is in turn based on economic opportunity, is paramount.

*Partnering with Transboundary Corporations:*

*Pskov Model Forest - Pskov Oblast*

Pskov Model Forest features a close partnership between WWF-Russia and a subsidiary of the multinational logging firm SturaEnso. Formerly called Enso, this company has logged in Russia for many years and took a hit from Greenpeace's market manipulation to save Karelia's old-growth forests. It was this specific instance of Greenpeace rattling Russia's forest industry, described in an earlier case, that convinced SturaEnso of the need to work with environmental NGOs such as WWF. In effect, we see a division of labor here in NGO environmental culture coming to Russia – Greenpeace confronts industry and government head-on, using economic and political force to imbue environmentalism with value; WWF cleans up the mess, heals the wounds, and shows industry a new, “greener” way of operating. This is precisely the case that Pskov Model Forest represents.

After the Greenpeace incident, SturaEnso established a logging subsidiary called STF-Strugy in the settlement Strugy-Krasnie, Pskov Oblast in an attempt to meet FSC standards of sustainability. Inherently, however, these standards and techniques frequently conflict with the Russian forest code and accepted industry norms. The company was repeatedly fined by the leskhoz for violations. Not being the PR powerhouse that WWF is, STF-Strugy failed to resolve these conflicts. In 2000, WWF came to the region and partnered with the company. In essence, WWF and SturaEnso, two monumental NGOs of the west, descended on a small, ordinary Russian locality and modified the commercial environment to comfortably suit European businessmen. WWF creates a plan of action for the company based on scientific research and coordinates each move with government officials, and STF-Strugy carries out the logging as the action plan specifies.

WWF launched a campaign to network with all stakeholders in the forest and to educate them about sustainable forestry, the ultimate goal being to convince them that STF-Strugy must be allowed to log according to FSC. With government, WWF held seminars and workshops, sent written information about FSC, and organized a few trips to Sweden so that government officials could study logging sites similar to those that WWF and STF-Strugy wish to import. The Model Forest's demonstration plots became a key instrument with which to educate forest stakeholders. By logging different forest plots with different technologies and techniques, the Model Forest showed different volumes of wood production with different repercussions for the secondary forest. Furthermore, WWF established a small grant program that would pay for any research or creative project that pertained to the Pskov Model Forest. Forestry research is actually very advanced in Russia, however, there is often little funding put towards implementation. Thus, WWF's small grant program became a unique opportunity for government officials in the Ministry of Natural Resources, several of whom carried out forestry research funded by WWF.

Before WWF, STF-Strugy had also received some conflict from the local public. Throughout the country, Russian citizens are directly dependent on forests, including the wild mushrooms and berries found therein. For this reason, there exists a general public mistrust of forestry. According to a social expert hired by WWF, the sight of a truck carrying logs meant that “things are going badly in the forests” (Interview with expert of social aspects of forest certification, 2002). In addition, community members were especially suspicious of a foreign company which they felt was sending their forests abroad. In working with the community, it became WWF’s job to soothe public opposition to forestry as such by illustrating the difference between conventional Russian forestry and FSC sustainable forestry. In effect, through an extensive PR campaign, WWF argued that by switching to the new, imported way of doing things, Russia’s economy, environment, and society would benefit. WWF used television programs and newspaper publications, and organized seminars and workshops.

In all projects that require the involvement of the Russian public, WWF uses the local intelligentsia (the educated class) as a tool for linking with the rest of the population. This Model Forest’s small grant program focuses on scientists, teachers, educators, a museum curator, and librarians. These people are often community leaders and help shape the rest of the community. For this reason, a social expert working with WWF called such citizens a “golden fund” which will “help to form public opinion” (Interview, 2002). Teachers and educators especially help to spread knowledge and ideas, and shape the mindset of succeeding generations. WWF brought its Model Forest, its money, and its Panda into the classroom by funding teachers’ environmental education initiatives through the project’s small grant program. This includes such programs as recycling, nature calendars, computer education, and a Children’s Club of Friends of WWF. With the benefits of FSC forestry and Western logging technology in school curriculums, they will in time become part of the local culture. This is WWF’s ultimate goal throughout Russia – to establish sustainable forestry, as developed in Western Europe (specifically Sweden and Finland), as a permanent feature of Russian environmental culture.

One of WWF’s main strategies with the small grant program was to take activities that already exist and enhance their quality while steering them towards environmental awareness and support of the Model Forest. Grants funded ecological summer camps and environmental clubs, and even turned a traditional community holiday involving saying “goodbye” to winter into an “environmental goodbye”. One interesting advertising strategy saw WWF sponsor a local school’s soccer team. The team is called Panda, and the uniforms contain the WWF panda logo as well as the label of the Pskov Model Forest. Each game they play promotes nature, and everywhere the team goes they bring information about the Pskov Model Forest. WWF further impressed the local population by bringing a famous football team Zeneet from St. Petersburg to play with the Panda team. Many people expressed excitement about this game, which also had a theme and symbol for nature. In short, WWF used the project’s extensive funds to establish the Panda logo as a lasting visual fixture and the phrase “sustainable forestry” as a lasting linguistic fixture in the Strugy-Krasnie community. The Model Forest, and its demonstration plots, became a renowned and one-of-a-kind tool for environmental education.

FSC criteria demand that the local community have a voice in forestry decisions. Raising public interest in the Model Forest, which WWF accomplished, laid the groundwork for official public participation. The Model Forest created a Forest Club that theoretically brings all forest stakeholders together into a productive dialogue. Once every three months, the Forest Club meets, and attendees include representatives of the company STF-Strugy, leskhoz workers, administration, forest scientists, WWF staff, and all interested local citizens. WWF bills the Forest Club as a model of democracy and citizen involvement in forestry, as it ideally, although not practically, happens in the West.

WWF brought an invaluable capacity to its partnership with STF-Strugy. By acquiring partners and support for the Pskov Model Forest, WWF laid the foundation for popular acceptance of STF-Strugy's foreign logging practices and the introduction of FSC in general. This case demonstrates the necessity of NGO legwork for Western commercial interests in Russia's natural resources. Our next case, the Preluzye Model Forest illustrates the reverse – that the cooperation of industry is indispensable for NGOs to bring Western environmental into Russian forestry. The head of Pskov Model Forest said, "Sustainable forestry is impossible without a commercial partner" (Interview, 2002).

*Moving Industry Towards Innovation:  
Preluzye Model Forest - Komi Republic*

WWF created Preluzye Model Forest in a region built on forestry, however, not export. Komi Republic is much further to the east than Pskov Oblast, and this one factor results in a disparity between the two different Model Forests. Pskov is close to Russia's European border and so it attracts the export-oriented subsidiaries of multinational European logging firms. Preluzye's leskhoz rents land mostly to smaller, Russian companies that orient towards domestic markets. Because Russian markets lack the environmental sensitivity and higher prices of European markets, these companies see little need to invest money in the creation of a green image. While Pskov represents an exception, Komi Republic represents the far more common situation of forestry in Russia's vast interior. The companies working in Preluzye Leskhoz do not feel as strongly the influence of European economics. For this reason, WWF's partnership with industry remains totally undeveloped. Nevertheless, Preluzye Model Forest received FSC certification in 2003. As we will see in this case, FSC certification of Preluzye Model Forest is not a case-closing benchmark of success. The project captured the intense interest of government and made progress in including the public in forestry decisions, however, the Model Forest and its FSC certification has had little impact on the day-to-day operations of the forest industry there. This region is not yet ready to adapt its practices to FSC standards, and there is little economic pressure to do so.

WWF's main partner in Preluzye Model Forest is Preluzye Leskhoz, a government structure. The aim of this project was to certify not the rented land of one company, as the Pskov Model Forest is trying with STF-Strugy, but rather to certify the forest management of the entire leskhoz. In a sense, the leskhoz acts as a local representative of the forest landowner - the federal government. Preluzye Leskhoz received an FSC certificate, however, this does not mean that wood produced by renting companies in the leskhoz will bear the FSC mark. For this to happen, individual

companies must certify the entire chain-of-custody. The certification already obtained gives these companies a head-start and may promote their interest. In this way, Preluzye Model Forest has been somewhat successful in bringing Western standards to Russian forestry. Preluzye Leskhoz' director, however, feels that the project does not focus enough on real, practical changes in forestry (Interview, 2002). He said, "Preluzye is an absolutely ordinary leskhoz in Komi. The [Model Forest] project lives its life and the leskhoz lives its own separate life. The approach to forest management and use is the same as elsewhere" (Interview, 2002).

With government, FSC has gained much legitimacy from this project. WWF's Preluzye Model Forest has received extensive support from local, regional, and republic levels of government. This is a success in importation, however, one that will only perhaps encourage future renters of Komi's forest fund to accept environmental standards of the West. In our interview, government officials showed themselves to be quite passionate about Preluzye Model Forest and its potential for bettering the region's economy. The head of Preluzye's administration said, "We really need the model forest to get certificate" (Interview, 2002). Furthermore, Komi's government shows a sense of personal ownership over Preluzye Model Forest. The head of administration in Preluzye region said, "we look at the project like our child" (Interview, 2002), while officials on the republic level claim that the Model Forest is a government initiative. Another official said, "In this project, everything started with the power structure, with the government" (Interview with chair of Forest Service, 2002).

As in Pskov, WWF's small grant program helped build government support. Several government officials on the republican level received grants for forestry research, and expressed a deep satisfaction for this opportunity, provided by WWF. The Model Forest also brought some government officials to Sweden in order to show them FSC certified operations. Such efforts quickly brought to the project government support in the form of scientific knowledge, leniency with forestry norms, and participation in the Model Forest's strategy development and planning group. Government officials in Komi have shown much more excitement about the project than those in Pskov.

There are, however, certain ways in which Preluzye Leskhoz cannot compare to STF-Strugi as a Model Forest partner. For the past ten years, federal budgets have notoriously under-funded leskhoz. Forest management such as revitalization, fighting forest fires, and controlling illegal logging, for which leskhoz workers are responsible, remains very weak due to extremely low salaries. Leskhoz workers are also responsible for thinning forests in order to produce higher yields. Now, throughout Russia, forest workers are "thinning" the best trees and selling them to supplement insufficient salaries. These hardships reflect on the performance of the Model Forest. In January 2002, a restructuring of the forest sector further hurt forest workers, and the head of Preluzye Leskhoz then saw certification as unlikely. While the leskhoz did in fact receive certification the next year, this respondent worried about its permanence. He said, "Maybe we will get the certificate now but . . . next year we will have real difficulties. They can take it from us and it will be much harder to get it back the second time" (Interview with head of innovation group, Preluzye Model Forest, 2002). He continued,

"Before January, the preconditions were more or less filled. Now not so much. We may get the certificate because the damage done by restructuring in January is not clearly seen yet. But if they come in

a year, they will say we are not doing thinning or paying salaries and we have no social programs. They will take the certificate back. We cannot expect renters to obey the law when we [lesnik] ourselves will not obey the law. We will be the main violators . . . Just now we are not violating anything, but if we are pushed to do this because we have to live . . . Workers ask me when they will get their wages. What will I say? We say we will not do thinning for profit but if we don't then we will sit without wages . . . This is the whole forestry sector in Russia. (Interview, 2002).

We took this interview approximately one year before Preluzye Leskhoz and the Model Forest received certification. The leskhoz is an unstable and unreliable partner for WWF's work, due to constant rearranging and oscillations of Russia's forest sector. STF-Strugi, however, as a subsidiary of a large multinational European corporation, has allowed Pskov Model Forest to run more smoothly than Preluzye.

Even though Preluzye Model Forest received its FSC certificate before Pskov Model Forest, the latter has proven a much easier task for WWF. Pskov began only three years ago, compared to Preluzye's six years of operation before certification. Throughout this time, WWF has dealt with problems of the leskhoz and lack of cooperation from industry. In fact, WWF divorced the Model Forest in July 2002. Preluzye Model Forest became its own NGO receiving funding directly from the Swiss Agency for Development and Collaboration. WWF left the project after six years mainly because of drawn out difficulties and extremely slow progress. As an organization, WWF wants to certify as much Russian forest land as quickly as possible. They felt that Preluzye Model Forest was not as much of a quick, sweeping FSC success as we predict Pskov Model Forest will soon prove to be. Furthermore, the fact that WWF left just before the leskhoz achieved FSC certification shows that perhaps they agree with the head of Preluzye Leskhoz in feeling that certification will not be permanent.

For the social aspects of FSC certification, WWF acted much as it did in Pskov. This project encountered similar barriers from the public, including a widespread suspicion of forestry in general. The head of Preluzye Model Forest's public outreach explained that people assume all logs carried by trucks come from the same plot leaving nothing (Interview, 2002). WWF overcame this perception by preaching the Western gospel of sustainable forestry, especially its promotion of social sustainability which would better the public's lot. They circulated information through libraries and schools, created discussion clubs, and used media to create television shows, newspaper articles, and art shows dedicated to loving and preserving nature. Through the small grant program WWF funded Ph.D. research into forest economics for local students and helped revitalize old Soviet structures for producing non-wood forest resources. Community relations represented a very extensive aspect of Preluzye Model Forest.

In order to involve the public in forestry, WWF created a club similar to Pskov's Forest Club. It is called Shuvge Parma (translated to "the sound of wind through the taiga forest" in the Komi language). The meetings of this club include various members of local public, leskhoz workers, scientists, and power structures in discussions about forests and their uses. One difference between this and Pskov's Forest Club is the size of Preluzye leskhoz and the fact that it contains dispersed villages, all of which are involved in the club Shuvge Parma. For this reason, Shuvge Parma is mobile and travels to different villages throughout the region, holding meetings and promoting public

participation. A successful example of public participation and activism started by this club is the case of virgin forests on the territory of the Model Forest. Here, WWF was able to mobilize members of the population to protect a virgin area that had already been rented by the large company Luza Les. While WWF had to first explain the concept of old-growth forest, it was easily accepted by much of Komi's native rural population, which is generally against industrial harvesting of any kind. Luza Les had already begun building an access road to log this plot of old-growth, however, WWF successfully educated and linked with influential members of the local population (i.e. intelligentsia) to oppose the company. In the end, Luza Les gave up most of the plot, while a compromise allowed them to log four small sections. As a note, FSC certification is not strictly against any harvesting of old-growth.

One aspect of how WWF tried to align Preluze Leskhoz with FSC's social standards shows the constraints of certifying a leskhoz, rather than a company's rented land. WWF held public meetings in which citizens could highlight areas of the leskhoz in which they gather berries and mushrooms. The Model Forest chose areas marked by many people and ultimately created a map of important gathering spots. In theory, this map would be used by socially conscious companies to choose their logging plots. On a lesser note, the map has become only a tool of the leskhoz to advise companies on which plots they may encounter resistance from the local population. In this way, certification of leskhoz does not directly transfer to logging operations on the territory. Likewise, Preluzye Model Forest showed successful public education, however, the director of Preluzye Leskhoz again criticized, saying, "The project is organizing courses, but these courses are far from practice" (Interview, 2002).

A change in environmental ideology for leskhoz workers and implementation of educational and demonstration programs is a good start. Yet, while WWF's relationship with government is close and very effective, the leskhoz is not the entity cutting the forest. Therefore, it is not an actual change in the way Russians cut their forests. The government of Komi Republic sees great economic potential in FSC certification and has helped WWF achieve many successes. These successes - in forestry research and in greening of legislation - are important, however, they are harbingers only of future change in Komi's forestry.

### Concluding Remarks

At once, globalization has brought both a danger to Russia's forests and a measure of protection. Since the opening of the border, companies from inside and outside of Russia have gained an interest in cashing in on Russia's vast forest resources. Simultaneously, the opening of the border has allowed transnational environmental organizations to enter the country's industrial and political arenas in order to protect those resources. Without this international intervention and the networks created by these organizations, Russia could easily become a worldwide exporter of raw materials and round wood. Without the enormous funds pouring into Russia from abroad, transnational wood flows would be much more wild and devastating for the Russian environment.

Each of our cases demonstrates particular European contributions to Russia in order to make this possible. On one side of Eastern Europe, Russia contains the forest supply and production side of the chain, while Europe the demand and consumption side of the chain. We have seen transboundary organizations working across this border,

appealing to the environmental consciousness of consumers in order to legitimize supply chains. With corporate and NGO networks extending across the border, decisions made by environmentally conscious European consumers penetrate and influence Russia. As a result, European influence has created maps of old-growth forest throughout Russia, new nature preserves, and the value of the concept of old-growth forest. Even though the concept of old-growth has no backing within Russian legislation, it has become a value and part of the vernacular among Russia's scientists, third sector, and forestry producers. This result is due directly to the consumer market campaign which took place in Europe, on the other side of the border. Ideologies and markets in Europe influence the goings-on in small Russian villages. Money raised beyond the border is spent in Russia, just as FSC standards are developed elsewhere and imported.

This chapter is the first study to analyze the introduction of FSC into Russia and enters the discourse of NGO governance within the context of globalization. The study of the influence of non-state market driven governance by Cashore (2002) showed various ways in which NGOs legitimize FSC and promote an interest in certification in various industrialized countries of Europe and North America. They are "converting" - an active process whereby NGOs change convince stakeholders of FSC legitimacy; "conforming" - changing FSC principles to better fit producer interests; and "informing" - spreading information to candidates likely to prefer FSC certification (Cashore, 2002, pg 44-45). In our study, WWF's Moscow office maintains a constant campaign of "informing", where they hold conferences with large companies and government officials. We rarely see "conforming" here, however, with Preluzye Model Forest's certification, the social demands of certification may have been slackened. For the most part, our cases showed a process of "converting" Russian government and industry, whereby FSC gains legitimacy with interest groups in Russia's supply chain that were formerly not interested. Cashore (2002, 56-62) describes certain characteristics of a forestry situation that would increase or decrease the ease of promoting FSC legitimacy. A boycott is one of the most effective methods - as we saw in our Greenpeace cases. Also, according to Cashore, in a case of fragmented land ownership, converting strategies weaken. In Russia, the federal government is the only land owner, however, in Preluzye Leskhoz, the case of many small companies renting pieces of the forest can correspond to fragmented ownership. The result matched Cashore's hypothesis, in that FSC gained little legitimacy with companies. Of course the main reason, in addition to this, was the distance to European timber markets.

Together, Greenpeace and WWF, with their specific styles of radical confrontation and more centrist compromising, respectively, helped carried out this conversion process in succession. We saw a division-of-labor where Greenpeace creates a stir with its campaign, and then WWF comes, partners with all stakeholders, and educates all about sustainable forestry. Greenpeace, on the one hand, never takes money from any governments or corporations - only charitable donations. WWF, however, as we saw, works on money from governments of Western Europe as well as multinational corporations. Accordingly, WWF works by creating policy networks with government and industry and usually compromises a bit more than Greenpeace. On a side note, these organizations rarely cooperate with each other due to these differences. In Russia, however, their disparate strategies complement each other and represent the unique way in which the forces of European environmentalism have come to Russia. The scheme has

proven effective. Together, as Castels noted elsewhere, these organizations form part of a new system of environmental governance and rule setting (Castells, 1998). A good example is STF-Strugly's willingness, even eagerness, to work with WWF after Greenpeace disrupted the company's operations in Karelia. Here, Greenpeace scares the company into concern for their markets, specifically environmentally sensitive markets, and WWF helps them improve their operations. WWF's partnership building is indispensable for changing and influencing policy in Russia, however, in this case, their partnership with industry would not have been possible.

While these specific characteristics of Greenpeace and WWF are seen throughout their international networks, different contexts call for adaptation. Wapner labels Greenpeace's efforts "political globalism" in that they appeal to audiences without regard to border or country. Greenpeace Russia, however, differs in many ways from its international headquarters. When working within Russia, Greenpeace does not rely on the public to strongly react to environmental issues as it can elsewhere in the world. Protest becomes a less important tool for domestic campaigns in Russia, while scientific research becomes more important. The maps of old-growth forest using satellites and research expeditions illustrate this. In much of the world Greenpeace is thought of as an unscientific, alarmist organization, however, nearly all activists working in Greenpeace Russia come from scientific backgrounds as a part of the Nature Protection Corps. This organization founded the Soviet environmental movement and was based in the classical science-oriented education of Moscow State University. This adaptation is crucial as we saw in Karelia, where the third sector must see to technical work in place of the government.

Similarly, although less pronounced, with WWF, the Russian branch has adapted the organizations worldwide strategy of "political localism" (Wapner, 1996, 10-16) to fit the Russian context. Wapner sees this worldwide strategy as an empowerment of the poor through local and low-impact forms of economic development and nature conservation. Wapner labels this sphere of NGO activity "sub-statist", as in below the level of nation-state (1996). Preluzye Model Forest's non-wood resource production fits this description, as does the strengthening of civil society through discussion groups and public forums. Due to Russia's specific breed of post-Soviet public disempowerment, WWF changes its strategy and channels environmental awareness and involvement in their projects through a community's intelligentsia. This is not always true empowerment of the individual, nor political localism on the most basic level, but rather often a popular acceptance of a WWF project. Accordingly, there are more WWF demonstration projects in Russia, in which the main partners are not citizens but local governments or industries. Both Pskov Model Forest and Model Forest Preluzye illustrate this point. In either case, public participation on the local level is only partial and fairly weak.

In addition to sub-statist, Wapner defines two additional arenas in which environmental NGOs operate – the "statist" and the supra-statist (1996). The former includes networks with government and international governing bodies, while the latter describes transboundary environmental campaigns that link with audiences irrespective of borders and established jurisdictions. Globalization has put such networks at the forefront, ahead of the nation-state, in building the new worldwide economy (Sonnenfeld and Mol, 2002, Pp. 1318-1320 ). Oosterveer describes these various informal interactions, which are beyond the law of any one government, as "hybrid arrangements"

(2003, 7). According to our observations in Karelia, NGOs worked with Western NGO partners in Europe in order to achieve sustainable forestry in Russia. They influenced businesses and forced a more civilized code of logging. This supra-state hybrid arrangement existed between an international NGO network and a scattered population of wood and paper consumers. This initial arrangement disregarded the role of the Russian government, and therefore was a truly non-state driven market campaign (Cashore, 2002). The Forest Club's follow-up of designating a specially protected area, though, had to involve the Russian government. The Russian government becomes an actor in the non-state driven market, although not a hierarchical authority. It acts along with NGOs to change and create new legislation.

In Pskov, we demonstrated a very close hybrid arrangement between WWF and the company STF-Strugy. This specific link has served as both a player in the policy process and an educator of governments. WWF has created the possibility of influencing the national government and revising the Russian forest code. In Syktyfkar, we see WWF's arrangements with the leskhoz and other levels of government in an effort to include Russian companies in FSC sustainability. These companies are not yet prepared for FSC processes and requirements, though. The partnership created by WWF has become an educational and demonstration project, which has, to some extent, changed the mentality of some forest sector players. In Murmansk we saw a small NGO as part of a global network, and we highlighted how it uses global processes to reach agreements with industry.

New rules are set up and implemented here within informal arrangements, the sum of which fully describes non-state driven market governance. Van Der Heijden studied globalization and noted that the process often compromises some aspects of the modern nation state, specifically its competence and authority (Van Der Heijden, 1999). Our findings show that the Russian government is no longer single-handedly running the country. Small third-party organizations in partnership with government and companies have become some of the more important participants in policy making. The loss of power at the national level that is caused by globalization (Sassen, 2002) is seen in all cases, perhaps most clearly in the case of Karelia. The nation has been fundamentally changed, and a civic geography has opened among sub-state roles.

Research on globalization and its effect on other Eastern European countries has shown results similar to those found in our cases. Baumgartl found that commercial firms in Eastern Europe were very important actors in environmental reconstruction (1997, 369). We saw the same thing in the case of Pskov Model Forest, where STF-Strugy is helping to import FSC certification into Russia. In Russia, NGOs are an intermediary in this interaction. WWF tries to adjust legislation so that STF-Strugy can use its own equipment and methods, and so that sustainable forestry can work. In Russia, as in Eastern Europe, the international community is essential and became an actor with an important role to play, especially given the limited human and financial resources of Russia. This form of international aid is extremely beneficial not only to Russia but to all of Europe and Asia as well.

Russia is a unique country with a unique history and equally unique natural resources. Processes of globalization are now acting to balance themselves and protect these resources. Transboundary environmental organizations represent a beneficial

addition to Russia's social sphere. By creating cooperative networks throughout Eurasia, these groups are helping to create a sustainable future for the country.

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