

January 12, 2008

“Global Civil Society Movements and the Anti-Asian Development Bank Campaigns: Defining the Democratic Culture in International Financial Institutions”¹

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem²

Introduction

The democratization process has generally been left to the level of the state or society. Concerns have generally revolved around the “the proper meaning of ‘political participation’, the connotation of ‘representation’, the scope of citizens’ capacities to choose freely among political alternatives, and the nature of membership in a democratic community (Held 1996, xi). However, through the decades, questions pertaining to the nature of democracy have “arisen not only about the ‘internal’ or ‘domestic’ character of democracy, but also about its ‘external’ qualities and consequences”. The reason for this is the “emergence of issues which transcend national democratic frontiers” (Held 1996, xii). One of these transnational concerns has to do with the democratization of the process of economic globalization. The relevance of this can only be gleaned with the emergence and the formation of alliances of transnational social movements linking with local social movements to push for democratization both at the local and global levels.

Particularly targeted since the 1970s have been the policies and programs of international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that are regarded to have adverse effects. For global civil society (GCS), as these international social movements have also come to be called, such problems could have been addressed had these IFIs adopted a more democratic culture which calls for the participation of civil society players in the formulation and implementation of IFI policies which directly impact on them.

In the Asian region, local and global civil society movements have targeted the Asian Development Bank (ADB). But this has not been traditionally so. Unlike the IMF and the WB, the ADB had generally carried out its development projects in the region in the background and thus had not been a priority target of social movements. But this changed after the 1997 Asian financial crisis when the ADB assumed a bigger role in the rehabilitation of the economically distressed Asian states and became a major economic player in the region. As with the IMF/WB, local and

¹ Paper presented at the the 8th International Conference of Third Sector and Sustainable Change: New Frontiers for Research”, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain, July 9-12, 2008. A substantive part of this paper was based on my article on “Linking Local and Global Social Movements and the Anti-ADB Campaigns: from Chiang Mai to Samut Prakarn”. This article will be coming out in the printed version of the Third World Studies Center’s *Kasarinlan: The Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*, Volume 23, No. 1 in January February 2009.

² Author is Director, Third World Studies Center and Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines, Diliman.

global civil society movements have pressed for the democratization of the ADB's process of decision-making.

The paper focuses on the extent to which these social movements are able to pursue this advocacy in the ADB. It argues how local and global civil society (GCS) movements have played an important role in pushing for a more democratic culture in the institution through the years. Focus will be placed on the anti-ADB campaigns during the 33rd Asian Development Bank Annual Governors' Meeting (AGM) in Chiang Mai, Thailand in May 2000 and the anti-Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project (SPWMP) which emerged as a major concern for global civil society movements during this event.

Discussions in the initial section will revolve around the criticisms of GCS against the undemocratic practices within the ADB. These include the formulation of policies which undermine the interest of the poor under the framework of the neoliberal paradigm and the need to push for good governance with regards to the implementation of ADB development projects. The second section of the paper highlights the strategies pursued by GCS in achieving their goals such as the formation of alliances and the use of engagement and confrontation vis-à-vis the ADB. And lastly, the paper looks into the achievements gained by such campaigns in pushing for a more democratic culture in the ADB particularly in their call for the ADB to pursue a development paradigm which would be beneficial to the majority and for the institution to be more transparent and accountable in the conceptualization and implementation of its projects. It also discusses the challenges that are confronted by GCS movements in this endeavor.

I. Globalization and the Emergence of an "Undemocratic Culture"

Although there is really no direct correlation between democratization and globalization, for some, globalization is seen to bring forth the spread of democratic ideals around the globe. For others, globalization brings forth the image of "an ever-widening gap between global "haves" and "have nots" (Budd 2005, 37). The Philippines together with other developing countries like Indonesia unfortunately could be classified under the latter. In these countries, patrimonial officials continue to use the state apparatus "to promote their own interests and those of their officials and those of their cronies" (Budd 2005, 37).³ The world has also seen the neutralization of the democratization movement (Harris 2003) as globalization thrives in a society where there is procedural democracy (not necessarily substantive) where there is supposedly a functioning executive, legislature, judiciary, political parties and elections, which are all trappings of a democracy. But because globalization is not able to address the gap between the rich and the poor (i.e. the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer), globalization has become generally selective with only certain sectors of society benefiting from development. This has been observed across developing countries in all regions. In Latin America, for example, the number of Latin Americans living in poverty increased in a span of a decade from 120

³According to Max Weber, a patrimonial state is one where "practically everything depends explicitly upon personal considerations (Weber 1968, 1041).

million in 1980 to 196 million in 1990 (Harris 2003). Because it does not address the socioeconomic inequalities within society, patronage politics and corruption continue to thrive. Thus, globalization has contributed to undermining rather than pushing for the democratization process. This is largely attributed to the two major criticisms of globalization as embodied by the neo-liberal paradigm and as related to the issue of governance.

A. Criticisms Against the Neo-liberal Paradigm

Criticisms against the neo-liberal paradigm have to do with the paradigm's emphasis on liberalization, privatization, and market forces that have produced not only further poverty but also socioeconomic inequalities.

The paradigm has resulted to the failure of developing countries to pay off huge foreign debts, much of which benefited corrupt dictators rather than the poor majority. It has not helped that the failure has been accompanied by the imposition of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that carry harsh loan conditionalities. The harsh loan conditionalities imposed by IFIs are criticized because loans are often extended in exchange for no wage increase, streamlining of government offices, or lay-offs. The SAPs are also tied to other IFI policies such as privatization the adverse effects of which resulted to the collapse of hundreds of companies, mass lay-offs, and unemployment. Social services are also cut down through neo-liberalism's dogged call for the privatization of social services. The "moral issue" comes in with the privatization of basic services such as education and healthcare as well as basic commodities like water and energy. IFI policies have also been seen to exacerbate the external vulnerability of nations as seen in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. What seems to be the lesson here is that IFIs are advocating development which does not encourage sustainability.

Global civil society movements have also heaped criticisms against speculative kinds of growth such as the stock market or hedge funds where capital easily move in and out of a country contributing to the neglect of the manufacturing sector. There is also the focus on real estate which does not produce anything except to give short-term employment. The IFIs' focus on liberalization and the supposed "comparative advantage" of countries has led some countries like the Philippines to abandon the production of rice in exchange for the importation of cheaper rice. With the increase in the price of rice, it has either become too expensive to import rice or there is none to import because of the worldwide rice shortage. Part of this unsustainable type of development is environmental degradation as a trade off for policies of economic growth.

Through the years, this has contributed to what has been referred to as the "moral vulnerability of markets". That is, although

there seems to be no coherent alternative to capitalism, yet anti-market feelings are alive and well, expressed for example in the moralistic backlash against globalization. Because no social system can survive for long without a moral basis, the issues posed by anti-globalization campaigners are urgent – all the more so in the midst of the current economic crisis (Skidelsky, 2008, S1/5)

Furthermore, the sentiment is that it is

morally better to have our goods supplied by free labor than by slaves, and to choose our goods rather than have them chosen for us by the state... (Skidelsky, 2008, S1/5)

The problem is not just the moral inadequacy of the economic virtues, but their disappearance. Hard work and inventiveness are still rewarded, but self-restraint, thrift, and prudence started to varnish with the first credit card (Skidelsky, 2008, S1/5).

These views hit at the very core of the kind of culture which IFIs are cultivating.

B. Criticisms Against the Issue of Governance

The other major criticism of GCS against IFIs has to do with the issue of governance. They have pointed out that there has been a lack or even absence of popular participation in the conceptualization and implementation of projects. As pointed out by former UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali (1993), “unrepresentative decisions on global issues can run counter to democratization within a state and undermine a people’s commitment to it”. This view is shared by Joseph Stiglitz (1995), former Chief Economist of the World Bank and Nobel Peace Prize winner for economics who stressed “the importance of grassroots level participation which enhances the effectiveness of development projects. Other Southeast Asian social movements share such views. These social movements have supported issues raised in the Battle of Seattle such as the “Statement from Members of International Civil Society” which critiqued the “undemocratic characteristics of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the inequalities it promotes...” (Rupert, 2000: 149).

Another major concern as regards the nature of the democratization process being perpetuated by IFIs is the absence of transparency and accountability and the issue of corruption. Global democratization implies that “global institutions must be more transparent, more accountable to citizens, and more open to varying forms of citizen access and participation...” (Smith, 2004: 61)

These criticisms have found their manifestations in the policies and programs of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and have been articulated during the anti-ADB campaigns in the 33rd ADB AGM in Chiang Mai, Thailand in May 2000 and the consequent anti-ADB campaigns against the SPWMP. The ADB SPWMP

was approved by the Chuan Government in 1995. The US\$605 million project is partly funded by an Asian Development Bank (ADB) loan of US\$320 million with additional funding of US\$70 million from Japan’s Overseas Environmental Cooperation Fund (OECF) and Bt750 million from Thailand’s Environment Fund, as well as funding from the National Budget Bureau⁴.

⁴ The OECF became the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) when it merged with the Japan Exim Bank.

Hailed as the biggest wastewater management system in Asia, the Klong Dan villagers together with the local social movements questioned why the project was moved into their area of Klong Dan when it was originally located in Bang Pla Kod and Bang Poo Mai.

In particular, the absence of participation of the Klong Dan villagers in the conceptualization and implementation of a project that would impact heavily on their community came under fire. The issue of corruption was also raised in a feasibility study report that revealed the plan to purchase 1,500 rai of land at Bang Poo Mai and 500 rai at Bang Pla Kod.

At Bang Poo Mai, the price of land was estimated at 200,000 baht per rai. However, the Pollution Control Department (PCD) which was in-charge of implementing the SPWMP, purchased the land at Klong Dan for 1,030,000 baht per rai, more than five times the estimated cost at Bang Poo Mai, and at a site far more remote (Sumi, 2000: 5-6).

The neo-liberal paradigm of the project also did not go unscathed. The project was described as anti-poor as it serves to aggravate the poverty of the Klong Dan villagers. The villagers believe that the ADB SPWMP would increase the salinity of the water leading to the death of mussel farming, the principal source of livelihood of the Klong Dan community. Issues pertaining to sustainability were also raised whereby the villagers accused the ADB of colluding with the PCD given the absence of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). This, they say went against Thai laws.

II. Global Civil Society Movement Responses to Democratizing the ADB

For GCS, these concerns could be addressed by pushing for the democratization of IFIs, in this, case the ADB. In particular, they would want the ADB to pursue pro-poor policies that address the socioeconomic inequalities in developing societies like Thailand. For them, it is important for the policies to allow stakeholders to participate in planning and decision making and for the policies to engender transparency and accountability.

The GCS, however, are not monolithic with their ideological approach and with their strategies in working for the democratization of IFIs. For instance, some GCS movement players agree with the neo-liberal ideology. While these people are more concerned with expanding the market and pursuing privatization policies, they believe in the regulatory role of the State. According to Howell and Pearce (2001: 17), the position of these people comes close to GCS movement players who

agree with IFIs that the problems of poverty and inequality can be solved with the right set of policies. Such mainstream civil society thinking draws on a particular history of the concept that makes it relevant to a problem-solving agenda of this type.

Members of the Greenpeace Southeast Asia's arguments follow along these lines. For instance, Greenpeace Southeast Asia has participated in the anti-ADB SPWMP campaigns as well as the campaigns led by the Bank for Information Center (BIC), an NGO based in Washington D.C. The ADB SPWMP project fitted perfectly into Greenpeace's advocacy because of the suspicion that corruption took place in its process of conceptualization and implementation. These NGOs not only push for transparency accountability, good governance, and the curtailment of corruption, but also gear their actions to produce policy legislative and structural outcomes.

However, there are also GCS movement players that do not agree with the neo-liberal ideology of the IFIs. This segment of GCS movement players believe in the need "to resolve the contradictions and tensions of capitalism and in particular, its atomizing, unequalizing and exclusionary effect" (Howell and Pearce 2001, 17). Exemplars of this in the anti-ADB campaigns in Chiang Mai include Focus on the Global South and TERRA (Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance and PER (Project for Economic Recovery). These GCS movement players believe that the problem lies in the embedded power relations and inequalities that make development an often conflictual rather than consensual process. They are concerned with "the extent to which the pursuit of commercial interests and gain is compatible with social and ethical responsibility to the wider society" (Howell and Pearce, 2001: 17).

A. Strategies Pursued by Global Civil Society Movements

Despite such differences, GCS have taken action to press IFIs like the ADB. to democratize This has led to "the rise of transnational networks, alliances and coalition of diverse sociopolitical groups chiefly dedicated to the contestation of 'globalization' in its various guises" (Colas, 2002: 82). The anti-ADB campaigns in Chiang Mai in 2000 and the anti-ADB SPWMP benefited from these transnational linkages as international NGOs like OXFAM UK and Australia and the Dutch organization BothENDS joined these campaigns. Such phenomena illustrate how international social movements have acquired linkages that cut across state boundaries independently (Bice Maiguashca, 2002: 5-6).

Such an alliance was forged in 1988 in the anti-ADB campaigns, with the emergence of the Asian NGO Coalition on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ANGOC). One of the Coalition's major objectives was to systematically question the ADB projects. Since 1992, engagement with the ADB is being carried out by the NGO Working Group on the ADB. In 2000, the group came to be known as the NGO Forum on the ADB, of which ANGOC became part (Quizon and Corral 1995).

These GCS movements pursued strategies against the ADB which were similar to those carried out against other IFI's such as the IMF/WB. These groups serve as testament to the ability of social movements to identify with each other's concerns and campaigns and to come together in the form of transnational alliances. Such a phenomenon is best explained by the diffusion model which maintains that "similarities among social movements in different countries derive from the adoption of protest or certain protest features from abroad.... (Guiguni, 2002: 19). These groups have employed similar strategies in the anti-ADB campaigns. These include the following:

Protest actions/demonstrations. Protest actions and demonstrations have been carried out against IFIs with social movements joining these mass actions for various reasons.

First is to express criticisms without the call for reforms but to abolish the IFI. This was generally inspired by the Battle of Seattle in 1999 against the WTO (Smith, J. 2002), stemming from the WTO's undemocratic, non-transparent decision making and deliberate exclusion of civil society in the trade body's workings. For instance, demonstrations were held against IMF/WB and WTO meetings in Genoa, Italy and Prague, Czech Republic, many of which ended in violence.

Similar protests and demonstrations have also been held by GCS movements against the ADB during the 33rd ADB AGM from May 6-8, 2000, described to be the biggest ever against the financial institution.⁵ However, unlike in Genoa and Prague, the protests have not been marred by violence. This is because Thai protest organizers asked their GCS movement counterparts to refrain from using violence since Thailand was hosting the meeting. Thai protesters also wanted to avoid alienating the Bangkokians or the middle class whose support for their advocacy against the ADB they needed (Tadem 2003).

Second, while GCS protest movements often focus on IFIs, they could also be directing their protest against particular states to put pressure on the IFI. In the case of the anti-ADB protests, the members of the GCS movements not only focused on Executive Directors who were attending the ADB AGM, Thai protesters also pressured their government to stop pursuing the policies of the ADB. For instance, protest actions have brought attention to the adverse effects of the IFI policies such as the privatization of social services, i.e., hospitals and education and the imposition of a water tax to the Thai farmers (Encarnacion 2003).

A third reason for protesting was to express criticisms to call attention to IFI projects like what was done with the ADB SPWMP. Such actions have been identified with the first generation of lobbying of NGOs and confrontation over specific projects which was

identified more with strategies to gain the attention of the IFI and its major shareholders. This included confrontation over specific projects and collaboration in project implementation and dialogue over issues such as participation" (Nelson, 2002: 148).

The anti-ADB campaigns in Chiang Mai could, therefore, be considered part of the strategy of the first generation of lobbying of NGOs because they call attention to specific projects of IFIs.

⁵ For further details, see Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion, "Thai Social Movements and the Anti-ADB Campaigns", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2003 and Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion, "Klong Dan Villagers Challenge the Thai State: The Case of the ADB Samut Prakarn Wastewater Treatment Project", *Public Policy*, Volume VIII, Number 1, January-June 2004.

But after bringing the attention of the ADB officials to the ADB SPWMP, the demonstrations against the project evolved into the advocacy of second generation of lobbying of NGOs. The second generation lobbying goes beyond calling attention to specific projects instead it directs its attention towards existing IFI mechanisms. In this case, there were inspection reforms to see if the ADB SPWMP complied with the rules and regulations of ADB projects. This form of advocacy emerged in the 1990s. Such second-generation reforms go beyond amending projects or adopting new policies to create mechanisms for expanding transparency, access, and accountability by disseminating information and opening an inspection panel to NGOs and communities from the borrowing countries... (Nelson, 2002: 136).

Engagement as a venue for democratizing ADB's management culture. Another form of strategy GCS movements have pursued against IFI's in their attempt to push further the democratization process in the ADB is that of engagement, which has taken several forms.

One is through the holding of global conferences on the ADB. Parallel conferences to those of the IFIs or heads of states have been organized by social movements as was seen in the NGO People's Forum on the ADB held from May 3-4, 2000. This served as a parallel or alternative conference to the ADB AGM in Chiang Mai from May 6-8, 2000. For the People's Forum, the GSMs' participation was initially limited to their role as speakers in the People's Forum on the ADB which aimed "to highlight how the ADB projects and policies are exacerbating poverty, destroying the environment, and undermining the rights, livelihoods, and food security of local communities..." (Tadem 2000, 382).

During the forum, speakers from the GSMs provided case studies in a number of panels on problems regarding ADB projects which helped put into context the panel on the SPWMP. The holding of such parallel summits has come to be regarded as "a permanent fixture of global agenda-setting conferences of intergovernmental institutions since the 1970s when streams of activism monitored meetings of the United Nations (UN) on environment, development, women, and human rights" (Pianta 2001).

A meeting was also organized by GCS movements with local social movements between the Klong Dan villagers and ADB officials from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Engagement as a way of pushing the democratization process in IFIs is not limited to engaging with the IFI's board of directors but also with officials of donor agencies as was the case when the People's Forum on the ADB organized a meeting during the anti-ADB campaigns in Chiang Mai between the Klong Dan villagers, NGOs, and Japanese officials from the Ministry of Finance. The meeting tackled the Japanese loan which went into the ADB SPWMP (Tadem 2000, 384). Japanese NGOs also arranged for Klong Dan village leader Dawan Chantarassadi to go to Japan to speak about the plight of her community not only to the Japanese public but also to Japanese decision-makers.

Aside from parallel conferences, anti-ADB campaigns have also held peoples' tribunals to "put on trial" IFI policies and projects. This was seen in the 34th ADB AGM in Honolulu, Hawaii where a "people's tribunal" was set-up to put on trial the ADB's SPWMP.

Another form of engagement is participation in the annual governors' meetings. This also happened during the 33rd ADB AGM although initially, the Thai organizers did not want GCS movement players to be part of the ADB AGM as they saw it as a form of cooptation. They, however, changed their minds (Tadem 2003).

GCS movement players have also undertaken engagement through direct intervention through its formal politics and institutional processes. Moreover, their intervention in national (and global) politics is perceived to have "important influence on the operation and evolution of international institutions" (Smith, 2000:66). As early as 1988, NGO efforts have led the ADB to approve its policy of *Cooperation Between the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Non-Government Organizations* in 1998 (took sometime in 1988 and formalized in 1998). The call for participatory development of NGOs have actually been integrated "into the ADB's policy papers on a wide range of sector-related issues, namely the forestry sector, involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, agricultural sector, energy sector, women in development and population policy" (Quizon and Perez-Corral, 1995: 44-63). The policy "commits the ADB to an expanded program of cooperation with NGOs with a view to strengthening the effectiveness, sustainability and quality of development services the ADB provides" (Office of Environment and Social Development, 2000: 1). The Office of Environment and Social Development (OESD) holds "primary responsibility for the development, implementation, and evaluation of policy and practice related to cooperation with NGOs, and for execution of many aspects of the ADB's operations involving the ADB's program of cooperation with NGOs" (Quizon and Perez-Corral, 1995: 44-63).

As regards the strategies of engagement and confrontation, what emerged during the anti-ADB campaigns is a combination of both protest and engagement. Local and global social movements, for example, participated in a People's Forum on the ADB held before the ADB meeting in Chiang Mai and was followed by the anti-ADB demonstrations during the ADB meeting. While there were demonstrations going on, local and global social movement players participated in a dialogue with ADB officials. The dialogues were carried out in the official and unofficial agenda of the ADB AGM. Hence, the "soft" and "hard" approaches can go hand-in-hand (Tadem 2003, 386).

Pressuring the IFIs at the domestic level. Another strategy is for the local counterparts of the GCS movements to pressure the ADB at the domestic level. This was seen, for example, in September 2000, when 1,000 Klong Dan villagers, jointly submitted a complaint letter to the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC)⁶ to investigate alleged corruption in the SWPMP. The local villagers and Thai social movements also found allies in the Thai Senate who were interested in exposing the anomalies in the project. Protest actions were also held against the government's role in the ADB SWPMP (Tadem 2004, 56).

⁶Although the NCCC has previously existed in the country, it was only in the 1990s, with the democratization process in Thailand and its new Constitution that it was given more "teeth" to make it a credible agency for addressing corruption issues in the country.

Another venue for protest is through electoral politics. This was seen when the Klong Dan villagers voted against the Asavane family who were believed to have stakes in the SWPMP. The Asavane lost in the local elections (Tadem 2004, 57).

Pressuring the state at the international level. While Thai social movements pressured the state at the domestic level, the GCS moved to pressure the state at the international level. Together with the Klong Dan villagers, Thai social movements and GCS movements sought to activate the Inspection Function (IF). The IF was established in December 1995 and the mechanism aims to (Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center (LRC) and NGO Working Group of the ADB, 2002):

- a) give affected people a formal channel for raising concerns about ADB's involvement in specific projects;
- b) assist the ADB's Board of Directors (BOD) in guiding the Bank's general operations; and
- c) complement other ADB efforts to improve project quality, transparency and accountability (Legal Rights and Natural Resources Centers (LRC) and NGO Working Group on the ADB, 2002).

Since its establishment, the IF was dormant until the case of the ADB SPWMP surfaced.

The Thai government, however, refused to cooperate with the ADB Inspectional Panel. For instance, it did not provide the panel with documents on the ADB SPWMP as requested by the ADB IP. The Thai government did not also allow the ADB IP to come to Thailand to inspect the SPWMP.

III. Increments Gained in Democratizing the ADB

The GCS movements' engagement and confrontation of the ADB in general and the anti-ADB SPWMP campaigns have contributed to democratizing the ADB. The contributions include:

Widening the space for democratization at the local level. The widening of the space for democratization at the local level is perceived to have a positive impact in the democratization process at the global level. The accomplishments of GCS movements serve as "case studies" that point out the shortcomings of IFI projects in the local communities. In turn, these case studies reinforce the local communities' advocacies against similar projects. All of these are part of the social movements' efforts to push for the democratization process because democratization serves as an effective venue for development to succeed, i.e., through its participatory methods. This is because development increases the community's stakes in defending its autonomy (Rajagopal, 2003:138). In relation to this, the anti-ADB and anti-ADB SPWMP campaigns have further strengthened the check and balance in the branches of government in Thailand as seen in the pursuit of the Thai Senate to investigate the project through the assistance of the National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC).

The anti-ADB SPWMP campaigns have also facilitated the linking of local to global governance and vice-versa as was seen with the NCCC's report on the SPWMP entitled "Businessmen, Government and Corruption" (Phongpaichit et.al., 2002). The report revealed that

... in the SPWMP, no environmental impact assessment (EIA) was made even though the project entailed huge environmental impact on the local environment and on the livelihood and welfare of the villagers living nearby. Furthermore, the Klong Dan villagers had no idea about the project before it was approved. The report also pointed out that "villagers around Klong Dan eventually objected to the project on the ground of its negative environmental impact. They sent petitions to the ADB... but got no satisfactory response".

Widening the space for the democratization at the global level. The anti-globalization campaigns also contributed to the political socialization of global activities which helps push for democratization at the global level. The anti-ADB campaigns, for example, have enabled transnational movements to link with both the Thai social movements and the Klong Dan villagers. This encourages the political socialization of global activities which is "crucial for the evolution of democratic skills and norms in a global arena that lacks formal institutions for democratic participation such as political participation and electoral institutions" (Smith, 2004: 12). The anti-ADB campaigns in general and the anti-ADB SPWMP campaigns in particular have enabled social movements to carry a universal ideology which seemed to have inspired and connected similar movements across the world enabling them to coordinate international solidarity to their cause (Colas, 2000: 75-76).

Internationalizing domestic policy decisions. An important component of democratizing the ADB is the internationalization of domestic policy. Local social movements generally play an important role in "internationalising domestic policy decisions" which has been viewed as the "internationalisation of government", particularly in complying with international norms set forth in international institutions of which they are part of (Nelson, 2002: 152). These norms, therefore, help to define what the democratization process should be not only among governments but also among the IFIs.

Such action is important because despite the internationalisation of social movements in advancing their agendas, "participation in national policies requires that significant response, initiative and real choice in national economic policy remain in the hands of national governments". This requires the continual development of a strong civil society that is able to shape national policy (Nelson, 2002: 152). What is important though is that the effectiveness of the international social movements and their transnational networking is that the main groups involved (namely the Klong Dan villagers and the local social movements) are nationally legitimate although the issues raised are framed differently within transnational exchanges (Grugel, 2004: 38).

The anti-ADB campaigns have also contributed to challenging the neo-liberal development paradigm of IFIs. The GCS movements have continually pressed IFIs to focus on the equity issue. Throughout these years, the NGOs felt that they have

gained headway with the ADB, which has shifted its Bank-wide lending priorities by focusing more on growth with equity to uplift the conditions of the poor in the region.

Integrating GCS movements' participation in IFIs. The anti-ADB campaigns in Chiang Mai led to the re-examination of the relationship of the ADB with NGOs. The ADB realized that there was a need to reinforce its ADB NGO Coordination Committee, which was then manned by one person and to allocate more resources for it. This resulted to the establishment of a Civil Society Unit.

This has been the trend among IFIs such as the World Bank which have given importance to NGOs in donor agenda by establishing within their institution “civil society units” and “civil society departments” as well as institutions devoted wholly to NGOs (Howell and Pearce, 2001: 91). These specialized departments seek to promote working with civil society in other parts of their organization. It also attempts to “set up projects and programs to strengthen civil society” (Howell and Pearce, 2001: 91).

Involvement of stakeholders in the implementation of ADB policies. The anti-ADB SPWMP campaigns also pressured the ADB to improve its consultation process resulting into the implementation of a number of policy measures within the Bank. One of these was in the area of Environment Policy. As pointed out by J. Warren Evans, Director of the Environmental and Social Safeguard Division and one of those responsible for the implementation of the SPWMP, the drafting of a new environmental policy for the Bank had high stakeholder involvement, both in quality and quantity (Evans 2002: 1). One-third of those involved came from the government sector, one-third from the NGOs, and the last third from the stakeholder groups. Participants agreed that the Bank’s Environmental Assessment Guidelines had to be revised. Another suggestion of the participants was that “the accountability and rules governing loans to the private sector should be specified more clearly in the Policy document” (Evans, 2002: 1).

The activation of the ADB Inspection Function, The activation of the Inspection Function, which was non-functional at the start, was also a big contribution of the anti-ADB SPWMP campaigns to democratizing international policy making. This was part of the GCS movements’ demand establishing mechanisms for good governance and ensuring their effectiveness.

In the case of the SPWMP, the Inspection Panel Final Report showed the ADB’s non-compliance to its policies and procedures in processing and implementing the SPWMP. Based on ADB’s Operation Manual (OM), the bank has not complied with the following provisions: Supplementary Financing of Cost Overruns on Bank-Financed Projects; The Bank’s Operational Missions; Environmental Considerations in Bank Operations; Involuntary Resettlement; Incorporation of Social Dimensions in Bank Operations; and, Good Governance (Asian Development Bank, 2001).

The establishment of a Compliance Review Panel and a Special Project Facilitator. Because of its shortcomings, the Inspection Function, which was proven to be ineffective was changed to become a Compliance Review Panel. A Special Project Facilitator position was also created and its task is to show that there has been compliance in the ADB project since the beginning. This will prevent ADB loans

from being disbursed if there is no compliance unlike in the case of the SPWMP (Rodriguez 2005). Such changes are quite substantive considering the nature of the ADB. For Quizon when his NGO ANGOC was formed, there was still no policy disclosure on the part of the ADB. Furthermore, there was no accountability measure (Quizon 2003).

IV. Challenges to Confront

GCS movements, however, also confront numerous challenges in their attempt to democratize the ADB. These include the following:

The debate on the strategies of engagement or confrontation. During the May 2000 anti-ADB campaigns in Thailand, there was a split among Thai social movements on whether to engage or protest. The quandary stems from the fact that unlike their counterparts in other countries like in the Philippines, Thais do not have a track record of engaging IFIs in conference settings. Thus, preference was given to demonstration rather than engagement (Tadem 2000, 381-382). This was also advantageous in a way because public demonstration allows for greater visibility and thus the potential to recruit members to their cause. Giugni and Passy (1998: 102) point out:

Such a shift in the strategy of social movements from mobilization to interest representation sees the concentration of their energy and resources towards the obtaining of their goals within institutional arenas. This has also led to the neglect of their typical means, e.g., street demonstrations and campaign. A disadvantage of this is that “these social movements lose public visibility and the potential to recruit new members who produce them with the legitimacy and negotiating power to be used in collaborative interaction with the state”. A worst scenario is that this will lead them to be cut off from their social support

However, engagement also breeds the fear of cooptation as members of civil society participate in the decision-making process. For instance, some members of civil society have gone on to become members of government.

Confronting Police States. Police States, in particular pursuing the right strategy to deal with these States, pose another challenge to GCS movements. The reason why a big anti-ADB demonstration was possible in Thailand has to do with the degree of democratization the country has achieved over the years. Government avoided clamping down on the protesters to prevent accusations of the government being repressive and not democratic enough.

The 33rd ADB AGM served as a venue for the Thai government to showcase the country as having vibrant democracy. GCS movements, however, did not find such a political atmosphere in the 2002 ADB AGM held in Shanghai, China, which is a Police State.

In Thailand, the government was left with little choice but to tolerate the demonstrations and respect its new Constitution, which allows for such actions against the state, to maintain the image of having a vibrant democracy. This seems to

differ from the general trend whereby the form, content, and eventual outcomes of gatherings like the parallel conferences on the ADB is “heavily circumscribed by the interest of states” (Colas, 2002: 18).

Interestingly, IFI conferences have been held in “Police States” to avoid incidences of demonstrations as was done in Doha, Qatar and Singapore.

The problem of unresponsive states The third challenge lies in democratizing local governance. The ADB SPWMP experience reveals that IFIs cannot rely on the State for this. The ADB Inspection Panel which was charged to implement the Inspection Function, for example, could not get the pertinent documents from the Thai government. Furthermore, the panel found difficulty in obtaining project-related documents belonging to the Thai government (laws, policies, etc.) and those considered Thai government documents by the ADB Management. Moreover, the Thai State refused to have the ADB Inspection Panel come to Thailand.

The SPWMP experience, therefore, forced the Bank to re-evaluate its relationship with borrowing countries. As one ADB officer expressed:

“Samut Prakarn has really changed the way we (the ADB) are going to process any loan for a mega-project in the future. We can’t just say it is up to government or it is up to the contractor to figure out the details. Now it is up to the ADB to determine” (Rodriguez 2005).

It is in this context that some have been pessimistic in looking at the capacity of Third World States “to act as real guarantors of the democratic aspirations of the masses in the Third World as sovereign States...” Instead, this seems to have been parcelled out up to international institutions... and down to NGOs” (Rajagopal, 2003:12). Furthermore, this is one situation whereby “states have the power to make policies that change people’s lives in immediate and meaningful ways and to enhance and protect their rights...” (Rajagopal, 2003:12).

The State, therefore, “remains the central actor in the enactment and implementation of progressive politics of transformation – as well as the principle barrier to participation and equity”. Thus, “activism whether transnational or national requires engaging with States to bring about change specially when activism aims to promise eminent political tasks such as deepening democracy.... (Grugel, 2004:16).

Undemocratic IFI Board of Directors. On the other hand, the ADB SPWMP experience also revealed the shortcomings of the ADB Board of Directors (BoD) particularly those from the developing States that refused to accept the findings of the ADB Inspection Panel which found that the ADB did not comply with certain provisions of the Operation Manual (OM). The ADB BoD, however, refused to endorse the Inspection Panel’s report. What emerged though were two factions within the BoD, “that is, the donor countries who endorsed the Inspection Panel report and the recipient countries who chose otherwise” (Bello 2002: 6). The ADB BoD decision also led to the resignation of two members of the Inspection Panel from the United Kingdom and Australia who were members of the BoD.

What aggravated the situation was that ADB also did not know how to deal with the Thai NGOs. As revealed by ADB resident in Thailand Craig Steffensen during the anti-ADB campaigns in Chiang Mai, because the Thai State thinks negatively of NGOs, the Bank had to “find a balance between their relationship with the NGOs and with the government”. This also explains why ADB’s dealings with NGOs have been minimal. Steffenson (2000) also notes “that there is a lot of mistrust between NGOs and the ADB and NGOs and the government”.

Such a revelation thus shows that States matter a great deal and despite the “rising trends of transnational activism... and the movement towards global governance”. The space therefore for civil society activities is viewed as not occurring in neutral terrain but is shaped by States themselves (Grugel, 2004: 38).

Reluctance of the ADB to activate mechanisms for good governance. A fifth challenge for GCS movements is how to pressure IFIs like the ADB to activate mechanisms of good governance. For instance, GCS movements have encountered a snag when the ADB refused to activate its Anti-Corruption Unit (AU) to investigate the SPWMP. The AU was set-up under the Office of the General Auditor (OGA) to investigate allegations of corruption concerning projects financed by the ADB. ADB, however, refused to acknowledge that there was corruption involved in the project. As a response, the social movements made use of local mechanisms for good governance, such as the NCCC to investigate the SPWMP. NCCC findings revealed that there was indeed corruption, which led to the prosecution of certain government officials.

Equally important as activating IFI mechanisms for good governance is improving IFI mechanisms for participation. For the GCS, they did not hesitate to recommend the “strengthening of specific guidelines on the consultation process and to consult stakeholders on the Environmental Assessment Guidelines”. Furthermore, the NGOs stressed that “the new policy should be stronger on disclosure information and the different environmental categories for projects should be defined in more specific terms (Bank Information Center, 2002c: 4-5). They also did not agree with the policy which laid the burden of environmental compliance on the borrower. The NGOs believed that the ADB should take responsibility for its own operations. This, they pointed out, should include guidelines as to how staff should be held accountable for complying with the policy (Bank Information Center, 2002a: 4-5)

The conservative and bureaucratic mind-set of ADB management. A sixth challenge for GCS movements has to do with changing the conservative and bureaucratic mindset of the ADB management. In general, members of the ADB management do not want to rock the boat. They are contented to receive their expatriate salaries and prefer to avoid controversy as much as possible. They are also generally suspicious of NGOs. For the ADB management, the problem lies not with the IFI’s policies and programs but more on miscommunication between the IFIs and stakeholders. It feels stakeholders just do not understand their project. Thus, the head of the ADB Civil Society Unit is a media person.⁷

⁷ Interview with member of the ADB management, 2006.

The reality is that the success of the strategies used by the anti-ADB protesters is also dependent at the level of the democratisation process within in the ADB itself.

We can understand the pessimism of some GCS players towards the utility of engaging the ADB to improve its mechanisms for good governance in this context. As a veteran NGO advocacy worker on the ADB points out, he has seen “how carefully-crafted and painstakingly-lobbied policy language did not really matter much when it comes to actual operations of the Bank”. He noted that “The Bank can always put the blame on governments for non-implementation of even the most well-crafted Bank policy”. He also expressed that to this day, they still have to see the Bank own up to violations of its policies. Evidence of this can be gleaned from the latest Inspection mechanism with the SPWMP (Laifungbam: 2002).

Challenges to redefining international norms. Another challenge for GCS in international policymaking is the advocacy for international norms which are also increasingly the potential effect of transnational networks whose purpose coincide with the purpose of the norms (Thomas, 2002:73). The ADB SPWMP experience for one has brought about the “festering antagonisms to the surface of the institution which has witnessed the board members from donor countries and those from recipient countries as increasingly separated by a wide gulf in values and practices” (Bello, 2002: 8). Much of it has to do with their concept of what the international norms are.

States whose practices (as was the case with the more authoritarian states like China and Pakistan) are “delegitimized by new international norms find that the political terrain has been tilted in favor of political challengers” (Thomas, 2002: 73). But States in general may have no intention of complying or promoting these new norms. The pressure to comply comes from “the formation of transnational networks by non-state actors sympathetic to the purpose of the norm” (Thomas, 2002: 173). The international norms which social movements have been fighting for through the years (e.g., transparency, accountability, and the democratization process in general) are norms which the ADB have adopted in principle and are pressured by social movements to abide with. In this sense, international factors like these have shaped the nature of social movements (Colas, 2002: 75-76).

Pushing further the democratization process at the local level. The last challenge that will be identified here posed by the anti-ADB campaigns for GCS movements is the need to further push the democratization process at the local level. A basic message brought about by these protest actions is that one cannot separate democracy with the popular struggle for development. More importantly, it highlights the important role of popular organizations in greater sociopolitical change, which some have viewed the liberal perspective has neglected (Wilkin, 1997: 40-41).

As seen in the anti-ADB campaigns, the Thai government initially dismissed the demands of the NGOs, dismissing these NGOs as “communist fronts”. The action of the Thai government is a position shared by governments that cautiously respond to the growth of non-state actors involved in global political processes in international institutions. Some of these governments have even actively attempted to restrict NGO participation in international institutions like the United Nations (Smith, 2004: 12).

In the case of the ADB BoD decision on the SPWMP, one of the Alternate Directors Ram Binod Bhattaria, who represented a group of countries that includes Thailand, attacked the ADB Inspection Panel for “disregard of the Thai authorities and lack of respect for the sovereign rights of Thailand” (Bello 2002: 6). This position was reinforced by ADB Director P.G. Mankad representing a bloc that includes India and Bangladesh and ADB BoD Zaheer Ahmed representing the Philippines and Pakistan who said that supporting the ADB Inspection Panel report would leave the Bank vulnerable to open-ended liabilities, bad precedents, and potential lawsuits (Bello 2002, 7). This highlights the fact that governing institutions, like the ADB can only be effective as States allow them to be. That is, States can frustrate these institutions if they go against the grain of State interest.

Conclusion

This paper has shown the relevance of pushing for a democratic culture in IFIs because concerns have transcended national boundaries. The anti-ADB and the anti-ADB SPWMP campaigns in Thailand have campaigned against the nature of the neo-liberal policies pursued by the ADB perceived by GCS movements to have resulted to the widening of socioeconomic inequalities in society. Under fire are the harsh loan conditionalities that have been imposed in exchange for the extension of loans. These have included anti-poor programs such as the privatization of social services. Such policies which emphasize on liberalization and the market have also rendered the economies of developing countries as vulnerable to external forces as was seen in the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

The Anti-ADB and anti-ADB SPWMP campaigns have also targeted the issue of bad governance specifically the absence of transparency and accountability which has led to corruption.

As for the strategies pursued by GCS movements, these have included policies of engagement, through parallel conferences to the ADB AGM meetings and confrontation such as protest actions. Engagement is usually intended to bring about changes in the policies of the ADB. As for the protest actions, these have come in the form of calls for the abolition of the ADB or drawing attention to particular adverse ADB policies in the attempt to changes these policies. These protest actions have also been used to activate ADB mechanisms for good governance such as the demand to activate the ADB Inspection Function to see if the ADP SPWMP have complied with the rules and regulation of the ADB’s Operation Manual.

These actions have also led GCS movements and their local counterparts in Thailand to simultaneously pressure the IFIs and the Thai government at the domestic and international levels to pursue their demands. The GCS movements have achieved gains in their attempt to democratize the ADB through the widening of the space for democratization in Thailand. This has been an important achievement in pursuing strategies of engagement and protest actions not only against the State but also the ADB with regards to the latter’s policies and projects in the country. This has been complemented with the widening of the space for democratization at the global level.

In the process, domestic policy decisions have been internationalized which is crucial as it holds IFIs like the ADB accountable to their policies whose impact also affects several States. By doing this, it is also easier to mobilize GCS movements in other countries which share the same experiences. The anti-ADB campaigns through the years have also witnessed the integration of GCS movements' participation in the ADB as well as the involvement of stakeholders in the conceptualization and implementation of ADB policies.

A major accomplishment of the anti-ADB SPWMP was the replacement of the Inspection Function because of its shortcomings as a mechanism for good governance and the establishment of a Compliance Review Panel and the identification of a Special Project Facilitator.

However, there are still challenges to confront which include the following:

- The debate on whether to focus on engagement or confrontation with regards to pushing for the democratization process in the ADB. The problem of the strategy of confrontation comes to fore when ADB AGM are held in Police States that do not allow protest actions.
- There is also the issue of members of the ADB BoD who do not believe that there is a need to democratize the ADB. This is not surprising given that a number of them come from undemocratic societies like China and Pakistan. They look suspiciously at the actions of GCS movements and also fear that these GCS are undermining their sovereignty.
- The reluctance of the ADB in activating mechanisms for good governance is not helped by the conservative and bureaucratic mindset of some of the ADB management.

These factors have provided obstacles to redefining international norms to a more democratic one. Despite these hindrances, however, the increments which have been achieved shows the optimism and possibilities for a democratic culture to be pushed in IFIs like the ADB.

Bibliography

Asian Development Bank. 2001. "ADB Inspection Panel experiences difficulty gaining access to key documents", Samut Prakarn Update #13, September 7, 1-2 in Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem 2004, "Kong Dan Villagers Challenge the Thai State: The Case of the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Treatment Project", Public Policy, Volume VIII, Number 1, pp. 45-78.

Bank Information Center. 2002a. "Chairman's Concluding Statement: Board of Directors' Decision on Inspection Request-Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project (Loan Nos. 1410-THA and 1646-THA), Board of Directors Meeting, 25 March.

Bank Information Center. 2002c. "External Consultations to Review the Inspection Function, Tokyo Consultation (Summary), 11 June 2002, 1-27.

Barkin, David. I. Ortiz, and R. Rosen. 1997. "Globalization and Resistance: The Remaking of Mexico", *NACLA Report on the Americas* XXX(4), 14-27 in Harris, Richard. 2003. "Popular Resistance to Globalization and Neoliberalism in Latin America". *Journal of Developing Societies*, 19, pp. 365-426.

Bello, Walden. 2002. "Controversial Report Poisons Board-Management Relations at ADB", *Too Hot to Handle: The Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project Inspection Process*. FOCUS on the Global South, May, 1-43.

Bice Maiguashca. 2002. **Contemporary Social Movements and the Making of World Politics**. Thesis submitted for the PhD in International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London.

Boutros-Gali, Boutros. 2001. "An agenda for democratizing" in Holden, Barry, 2000. **Global Democracy: Key Debates**. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 105-124.

Budd, Eric. 2005. "Whither the Patrimonial State in the Age of Globalization?", *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*, 20 (2), 37-55.

Colas, Alejandro. 2002. **International Civil Society**. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Collins, Joseph and J. Lear. 1995. **Chile's Free-Market Miracle: A Second Look**. Oakland, California: Food First.

Evans, Warren J. 2002. ADB Director, Environmental and Social Safeguard Division". Letter to Violet Perez-Corral, NGO Forum on the ADB, April 9-13.

Green, David. 1995. **Silent Revolution: The Rise of Market Economics in Latin America**. London: Cassell in Harris, Richard. 2003. "Popular Resistance to Globalization and Neoliberalism in Latin America". *Journal of Developing Societies*, 19, pp. 365-426.

Giugni, Marco G. and Florence Passy, "Chapter 4: Contentious Politics in Complex Societies: New Social Movements between Conflict and Cooperation" in Giugni, Marco, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly. 1998. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., pp. 81-107.

Grugel, Jean. 2004. "Chapter 2: State power and transnational activism", in Piper, Nicola and Anders Uhlin. **Transnational Activism in Asia: Problems of power and democracy**. London and New York: Routledge, 26-42.

Hardt, Michael and Antonino Negri. 2003. "Foreword". In **Another World is Possible**, edited by William Fisher and Thomas Ponniah. London: Zed Books in Harris, Richard. 2003. "Popular Resistance to Globalization and Neoliberalism in Latin America". *Journal of Developing Societies*, 19, pp. 365-426.

Harris, Richard. 2003. "Popular Resistance to Globalization and Neoliberalism in Latin America". Journal of Developing Societies, 19, pp. 365-426.

Harvey, Neil. 1996. "Rural Reforms and the Zapatista Rebellion: Chipas 1988-1995. In **Neo-liberalism Revisited: Restructuring and Mexico's Political Future**, edited by Gerardo Otero. Boulder, Colorado: Westview in Harris, Richard. 2003. "Popular Resistance to Globalization and Neoliberalism in Latin America". Journal of Developing Societies, 19, pp. 365-426.

Held, David. 1996. **Models of Democracy**. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Howell, Jude and Pearce, Jenny. 2001. **Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration**. U.S.A. & U.K.: Lynne Rienner Publications Inc.

Laifungbam, Roy. 2002. Member, Core Centre for Organization, Research and Education (Indigenous People's Centre for Policy and Human Rights in India's North East), Letter to NGO alliance on the ADB, April 24.

Latin American Weekly Report (LAWR). 1997. "Argentina: Menem's Decrees 'Unconstitutional,'" January 7, p. 15 in Harris, Richard. 2003. "Popular Resistance to Globalization and Neoliberalism in Latin America". Journal of Developing Societies, 19, pp. 365-426.

Legal Rights and Natural Resources Centers (LRC) and NGO Working Group on the ADB, 2002 in Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem 2004, "Kong Dan Villagers Challenge the Thai State: The Case of the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Treatment Project", Public Policy, Volume VIII, Number 1, pp. 45-78.

Nelson, Paul J. 2002. "Chapter 7: Agendas, Accountability, and Legitimacy Among Transnational Networks Lobbying the World Bank", in Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker and Kathryn Kikkink. Eds. **Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms**. Social Movements, Protest, and Contention, Volume 14. Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 131-154.

People's Forum 2000. 2000. "Executive Summary Press Briefing on the Asian Development Bank", May 1 in Tadem, "Thai Social Movements and the anti-ADB Campaign, p. 383.

Quizon, Antonio B. 2003. Interview. (Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development), Angoc Office, Quezon City.

Quizon, Antonio B. and Perez-Corral, Violeta. 1995. "The NGO Campaign on the Asian Development Bank". Manila: Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development.

Robinson, William. 1998/1999. "Latin America and Global Capitalism". Race and Class. 40(2/3): 111-130 in Harris, Richard. 2003. "Popular Resistance to

Globalization and Neoliberalism in Latin America”, Journal of Developing Societies, 19; 365.

Rodriguez, Edgardo. 2005. Interview. Principal Development Effectiveness Specialist Operations Evaluation Department. Asian Development Bank. January 21, Handwritten notes.

Skidelsky, Robert. 2008. “The moral vulnerability of markets”. Business World. 30 April 2008.

Smith, Jackie. 2002. “Chapter 5: Social Movements, International Institutions and Local Empowerment”, in Stiles, Kendall. 2000. **Global Institutions and Local Empowerment: Competing Theoretical Perspectives**. Great Britain: MacMillan Press Ltd., pp. 65-84.

Stevenson, M. 2003. “Thousands to March Against Fox as Mexican Government in Leadership Crisis”. *Associated Press*, November 27. Retrieved November 28, 2003 (http://sfgate.com/cgi/article.cgi?fil.../international_1122EST6480.DTL&type=printable) in Harris, Richard. 2003. “Popular Resistance to Globalization and Neoliberalism in Latin America”. Journal of Developing Societies, 19, pp. 365-426.

Smith, Jackie. 2004. “Chapter 4: Transnational Activism, Institutions and Global Democratization”, in Piper, Nicola and Anders Uhlin. **Transnational Activism in Asia: Problems of power and democracy**. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 61-77.

Steffensen, Craig. 2000. Interview. ADB Resident Advisor, ADB Thailand Office, 21 August.

Stiglitz, Joseph. 1995. “Participation and Development: Perspectives from the Comprehensive Development Paradigm: Remarks at the *International Conference on Democracy, Market Economy and Development*. February 27, Seoul, Korea in Rajagopal, Balakrishnan. 2003. **International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sumi, Kazuo. 2000. “An Environmental Conservation Project That Invites Environmental Destruction: A Growing Criticism Against ‘Deceptive Aid’ by the Asian Development Bank and Japan,” unpublished paper, Niigata University, Japan 25 August in Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion, “Thai Social Movements and the Anti-ADB Campaigns”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2003.

Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion, “Thai Social Movements and the Anti-ADB Campaigns”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2003.

Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion, “Klong Dan Villagers Challenge the Thai State: The Case of the ADB Samut Prakarn Wastewater Treatment Project”, Public Policy, Volume VIII, Number 1, January-June 2004.

Thomas, Caroline. 1997. "Globalization and the South" in Thomas, Caroline and Wilkin, Peter. 1997. **Globalization and the South**. Great Britain: MacMillan Press Ltd., pp. 1-17.

Veltmeyer, Henry, James Petras, and S. Vieu. 1997. **Neoliberalism and Class Conflict in Latin America**. New York: St. Martin's Press in Harris, Richard. 2003. "Popular Resistance to Globalization and Neoliberalism in Latin America". Journal of Developing Societies, 19, pp. 365-426.

Weber, Max. 1968. **Economy and society: An Outline of interpretive sociology**. New York: Bedminster Press in Budd, Eric. 2005. "Whither the Patrimonial State in the Age of Globalization?", Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies, 20 (2), 37-55.

Wilkin, Peter. 1997. "New Myths for the South: Globalization and Conflict between Private Power and Freedom" in Thomas, Caroline and Wilkin, Peter. **Globalization and the South**. Great Britain: MacMillan Press Ltd., pp. 18-35.